Abstract: We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We …rst establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s when the number of replicas tends to in…nity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payo¤ that is not a competitive equilibrium payo¤.
Introduction
We study two cooperative solutions for a class of markets with indivisible goods modeled as generalized assignment games. Shapley and Shubik (1972) de…ned an assignment game as a market where each seller owns one indivisible object and each buyer, who wants to buy at most one object, has valuations over all objects. An assignment is a description of deliveries of objects from sellers to buyers and a price vector is a list of prices, one for each object. A competitive equilibrium of a market is a price vector and a feasible assignment at which each seller maximizes revenues, each buyer maximizes net valuations, and markets clear. Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that the set of competitive equilibria is non-empty, competitive equilibrium assignments are optimal (the …rst welfare theorem holds), any optimal assignment is part of a competitive equilibrium with any of the competitive equilibrium price vectors (a strong version of the second welfare theorem holds without requiring any redistribution of the initial endowments), and the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s coincides with the Core of a naturally associated TU game (no enlargement or replica of the market is required for their coincidence).
We consider a generalized assignment game representing a market with a given number of indivisible units of di¤erent goods, where sellers may own di¤erent units of each of the goods and buyers, who may want to buy several units of di¤erent goods up to an exogenous total amount, have constant marginal valuations of each good. Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009) extend Shapley and Shubik (1972) 's results for this generalized assignment game. In particular, they show that the set of competitive equilibria is non-empty, it is the Cartesian product of the set of competitive equilibrium price vectors and the set of optimal assignments, the set of competitive equilibrium price vectors has a lattice structure with the natural partial order of vectors "to be larger or equal than", and this lattice structure is partly translated in a dual way to the sets of buyers and sellers'utilities that are attainable at competitive equilibria.
In this paper we study two di¤erent cooperative solutions for this class of markets and their relationship with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. The two solutions di¤er on how a coalition of buyers and sellers can block a proposed payo¤ vector. Given an assignment and a coalition of buyers and sellers, some of them may be buying or selling some units of some goods to sellers or buyers outside the coalition. The notion of the Core corresponds to the notion of blocking that requires that all members of the coalition have to break all exchanges performed with all agents outside the coalition and buy or sell only with members within the coalition. In contrast, the concept of Set-wise stability corresponds to the notion of blocking that admits that members of the coalition may completely or partly keep their exchanges performed with non-members. Since Set-wise blocking is easier than Core-wise blocking, the Set-wise stable set is a subset of the Core. We show here that the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is contained in the Set-wise stable set. Hence, the Set-wise stable set as well as the Core are non-empty. Moreover, we exhibit two simple markets showing that these inclusions may be strict.
The main contribution of the paper is to answer a¢ rmatively the following question. Do the Core and the Set-wise stable set converge to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s when the market becomes large? The question is relevant because competitive equilibrium requires price-taking behavior which only makes sense when individual quantity decisions are perceived by each agent as being negligible. To create a setting where price-taking behavior is meaningful we follow the well established tradition in Economics to enlarge the environment by replicating the market. We …rst show that the Core converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s when the number of replica tends to in…nity and hence, the Set-wise stable set converges as well. However, we show that the Set-wise stable set already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s for a two-fold replicated market. Finally, we show that for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payo¤ that is not a competitive equilibrium payo¤. Thus, the notion of Set-wise stability is much closer (not only in terms of set-wise inclusion) to competitive equilibrium than the notion of Core.
There are many other papers that recently have studied the relationship between the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s and alternative cooperative solutions in many-to-one or many-to-many generalizations of Shapley and Shubik (1972) 's assignment game. Sotomayor (1992 and 1999a ) study a many-to-many assignment game with two …nite and disjoint sets of agents. Each agent from each side can form a maximal number of partnerships with the agents from the other side. Each partnership generates a total payo¤ that may be shared by its two members. Observe that in this extension partnerships are binary; speci…cally, if a buyer and a seller form a partnership they can exchange just one indivisible unit of the good held by the seller. Sotomayor (1992) proves that all pair-wise stable assignments are optimal and Sotomayor (1999a) shows that the set of pair-wise stable payo¤s has a complete and dual lattice structure. Sotomayor (1999b) proposes the notion of Set-wise stability for the former model and shows that the pair-wise stable set (that may be empty) is a subset of the Core. Camiña (2006) studies a market with one seller, that owns a given number of (potentially) di¤erent objects, and several buyers who want to buy at most one object. She shows that the Core and the Set-wise stable set coincide, the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is non-empty and it is a subset of the Core. Moreover, she shows that the Core has a complete lattice structure with the partial order coming from comparing buyers'payo¤ vectors with the partial order and this structure is not dual. Sotomayor (2007) studies a generalized assignment game similar to ours but with two important di¤erences: (i) sellers only own units of a unique good and each good is only owned by a particular seller and (ii) buyers may want to buy several units but partnerships are also binary because buyers are not interested in buying more than one unit from each seller. She shows that the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is a non-empty, complete and dual lattice. Sotomayor (2009) extends Sotomayor (1992 and 1999a ) and considers a time-sharing assignment game where both buyers and sellers own a …xed amount of a divisible good (labor time) and to form a partnership a buyer and a seller have to agree to contribute each with the same amount of labor time and to share, in a particular proportion, the amount of money that is proportionally obtained from the jointly contributed amount of labor time. Sotomayor (2009) studies di¤erent solution concepts for di¤erent kinds of coalitional interactions. In particular, she shows the inclusion relationships that hold among the non-empty sets of competitive equilibrium payo¤s, the Core, the Set-wise stable set, the Strong stable set and the set of dual allocations. Moreover, she also shows that some of these sets have a lattice structure. Milgrom (2009) introduces and studies the space of assignment messages to investigate (and solve) the di¢ culty that agents face when reporting their "types" (or valuations of goods, or sets of goods) in some mechanism design settings. The model is very general and contains as particular cases multi-unit auctions (with substitutable goods), exchange economies, and integer assignment games. Milgrom (2009) focuses on the study of the non-emptyness of the set of competitive equilibrium prices and its lattice structure but he does not analyze any cooperative solution. Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009) study using linear programming the same model than the present one but they only focus on the study of the Cartesian product and lattice structures of the set of competitive equilibria and the corresponding sets of agents'utilities.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we de…ne a market. In Section 3 we present the notions of Core and Set-wise stability and show that the Set-wise stable set is a non-empty subset of the Core. In Section 4, and closely following Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), we de…ne a competitive equilibrium of a market. We then show that the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is contained in the Set-wise stable set. In Section 5 we de…ne, for any positive integer , a fold replica of a market and show in Theorem 1 that the limit of the sequence of the Cores of replicated markets coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s when the number of replicas tends to in…nity. In Theorem 2 we show that the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. Finally, in Theorem 3 we show that for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payo¤ that is not a competitive equilibrium payo¤. An appendix at the end of the paper collects the proofs that have been omitted in the main text.
Preliminaries
A generalized assignment game (a market) consists of seven objects. Three …nite and disjoint sets: the set B = fb 1 ; :::; b m g of buyers, the set G = fg 1 ; :::; g n g of goods, and the set S = fs 1 ; :::; s t g of sellers. We identify a generic buyer with b i or with just i, a generic good with g j or with just j, and a generic seller with s k or with just k.
Buyers have a constant marginal valuation of each good. Let v ij 0 be the monetary valuation that buyer i assigns to each unit of good j; namely, v ij is the maximum price that buyer i is willing to pay for each unit of good j: Denote by V = (v ij ) (i;j)2B G the matrix of valuations. We assume that buyer i 2 B can buy at most d i 2 Z + nf0g units in total, where Z + is the set of non-negative integers. The strictly positive integer d i should be interpreted as a capacity constraint due to limits on i's ability for storage, transport, etc. Denote by d = (d i ) i2B the vector of maximal demands. Each seller k 2 S has q jk 2 Z + indivisible units of each good j 2 G. Denote by Q = (q jk ) (j;k)2G S the capacity matrix. Let r jk 0 be the monetary valuation that seller k assigns to each unit of good j; that is, r jk is the reservation (or minimum) price that seller k is willing to accept for each unit of good j. Denote by R = (r jk ) (j;k)2G S the matrix of reservation prices. Some sellers may not have any unit of some of the goods. However, we require that the seller's reservation price of a good that he has no units to sell has to be equal to zero; namely, for all k 2 S and all j 2 G, if q jk = 0 then r jk = 0:
We also assume that there is a strictly amount of each good; namely, for each j 2 G there exists k 2 S such that q jk > 0:
A market M is a 7-tuple (B; G; S; V; d; R; Q) satisfying conditions (1) and (2). Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s (one-to-one) assignment game is a special case of a market where each buyer can buy at most one unit, there is only one unit of each good, and each seller only owns one unit of one of the goods; i.e., d i = 1 for all i 2 B, n = t, and for all (j; k) 2 G S, q jk = 1 if j = k and q jk = 0 if j 6 = k.
Let M be a market. An assignment for market M is a three-dimensional integer matrix
describing a collection of deliveries of units of the goods from buyers to sellers. Each A ijk should be interpreted as "buyer i receives A ijk units of good j from seller k."We often omit the sets to which the subscripts belong to and write, for instance, P ijk A ijk and
A ijk , respectively. The assignment A is feasible for market M if each buyer i buys at most d i units and each seller k sells at most q jk units of each good j. We are only interested on feasible assignments. Denote by F the set of all feasible assignments of market M ; namely,
be the per unit gain from trade of good j between buyer i and seller k. If seller k does not have any unit of good j the per unit gain from trade of good j with all buyers is equal to zero. The total gain from trade of market M at assignment A is
De…nition 1 A feasible assignment e A is optimal for market M if, for any feasible assign-
Let e F be the set of all optimal assignments for market M . The set e F is always nonempty. 
Cooperative Solutions
We present now two alternative cooperative solutions for market M . They di¤er on how a coalition (a subset) of agents can block a proposal of how to distribute among all agents the total gain from trade obtained at any optimal assignment. The Core assumes that members of a blocking coalition can only form partnerships among themselves and have to break all former partnerships with non-members. Set-wise stability allows members of a blocking coalition to keep or reduce their former exchanges with members outside the blocking coalition. Thus, Set-wise blocking is easier than Core-wise blocking. It seems to us that Set-wise stability is also a more reasonable solution for this class of markets. Our results will indicate from two points of view that Set-wise stability is closer to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s than the Core is: (i) (set inclusion) closer and (ii) Setwise stability and the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s already coincide in a two-fold replicated market.
Core
Let M = (B; G; S; V; d; R; Q) be a market and let C B [ S be a coalition. Denote the subsets of buyers and sellers in C by B C = C \ B and S C = C \ S, respectively.
De…nition 2 A feasible assignment A is Core compatible with coalition C if A ijk 6 = 0 implies fi; kg C:
That is, a feasible assignment A is Core compatible with C if all members of C interact only among themselves. Let A be an assignment Core compatible with coalition C and denote by A C the feasible assignment for submarket M C , where
When the reference coalition is clear from the context we often omit the superscript C.
Denote by F C the set of feasible assignments for submarket M C and by e F C the set of its optimal assignments; i.e.,
Fix a market M: To de…ne a cooperative game v with transferable utility associated to M , let C B [ S be a coalition and set
where e A C is any optimal assignment of submarket M C . Namely, v(C) is the maximal total utility that members of C can guarantee by exchanging their resources only among themselves. Obviously, v(C) = 0 for all C such that either B C = ? or S C = ?, and hence,
A payo¤ of market M is a distribution among agents of the total gains from trade at any optimal assignment of market M . Let C be the set of payo¤s belonging to the Core of market M . When we want to emphasize market M we write C M . Proposition 1 below states that the Core is always non-empty.
Proposition 1 Every market has a non-empty Core.
Proof See the appendix.
Set-wise Stability
The notion of Core blocking requires that all members of the blocking coalition have to give up all previous exchange agreements with non-members. However this may be too drastic because, in some circumstances, it is reasonable to let members of the blocking coalition to keep some (or all) previous exchanges with members outside the blocking coalition. This stronger notion of blocking gives rise to the notion of Set-wise stability.
2
De…nition 5 Let M be a market and C be a coalition. A feasible assignment b A for market M is SW compatible with C if there exists an optimal assignment e A 2 e F such that:
Let be a distribution matrix and assume v ij r jk for some (i; j; k) 2 B G S. Then, ijk describes a way of how buyer i and seller k could split the gain v ij r jk that they would obtain from trading one unit of good j: buyer i receives v ij ijk and seller k receives ijk r jk . If v ij < r jk then the value ijk will be irrelevant because i and k do not trade good j at any optimal assignment. Observe that a distribution matrix is not necessarily anonymous because a buyer can obtain di¤erent per unit gains from buying good j from two di¤erent sellers, and viceversa.
S for market M is SW blocked by coalition C B [ S if for any distribution matrix = ( ijk ) (i;j;k)2B G S there exists a feasible assignment b A that is SW compatible with C and P
Namely, members of a coalition SW block a payo¤ vector if independently of the agreements they have with non-members they can jointly obtain a strictly higher payo¤ by reassigning their exchanges among themselves and by keeping or reducing their exchanges with non-members. Denote by SW the set of Set-wise stable payo¤s. When we want to emphasize market M we write SW M : Let (u; w) 2 R B R S be a payo¤ of market M and assume that coalition C Core blocks (u; w). Let e A C 2 e F C be arbitrary. Then,
Let b A be the feasible assignment where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S,
A is a feasible assignment SW compatible with C and for any distribution matrix ,
Hence, coalition C SW blocks (u; w): Thus, the Set-wise stable set is a subset of the Core. For further reference, we state this fact below as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 For any market the Set-wise stable set is a subset of the Core.
Competitive Equilibria and Basic Results

De…nitions and Preliminaries
We de…ne a competitive equilibrium of market M by following Jaume, Massó and Neme (2009). Assume buyers and sellers trade through competitive markets. That is, there is a unique market (and its corresponding unique price) for each of the goods and buyers and sellers are price-takers. Given a price vector p = (p j ) j2G 2 R G + sellers supply units of the goods (up to their capacity) in order to maximize revenues at p and buyers demand units of the goods (up to their maximal demands) in order to maximize the total net valuation at p.
Supply of seller k: For each price vector p = (p j ) j2G 2 R G + , seller k supplies of every good j any feasible amount that maximizes revenues; namely,
fq jk g if p j > r jk f0; 1; :::; q jk g if p j = r jk f0g if p j < r jk :
To de…ne the demands of buyers we need the following notation. Let p 2 R G + be given and consider buyer i. Let
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximum (and strictly positive) net valuation at p. Obviously, for some p; the set r > i (p) may be empty. Let
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximum (and non-negative) net valuation at p. Obviously, for some p; the set r i (p) may also be empty. Obviously, for all p 2 R n + and all i 2 B, r
Demand of buyer i: For each price vector p = (p j ) j2G 2 R n + , buyer i demands any feasible amounts of the goods that maximize the net valuations at p; namely,
describes the set of all trades that maximize the net valuation of buyer i at p: Observe that the set of trades described by each element in the set D i (p) give the same net valuation to buyer i; i.e., i is indi¤erent among all trade plans 2 D i (p):
Let A be an assignment and let i be a buyer. We denote by
(E.S) For each good j 2 G and each seller k 2 S;
We say that a price vector p and a feasible assignment A are compatible if (p; A) is a competitive equilibrium of market M . The vector p 2 R G + is a competitive equilibrium price of market M if there exists A 2 F such that (p; A) is a competitive equilibrium of market M .
Let e P be the set of competitive equilibrium prices of market M: The set e P is always non-empty. 3 For further reference, we state this fact without proof as a proposition below.
Proposition 3
The set of competitive equilibrium prices of any market is non-empty.
Moreover, by Proposition 4 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), the set of competitive equilibria has a Cartesian product structure. We also state this fact without proof as Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Let M be a market. Then, (p; A) is a competitive equilibrium of M if and only if p 2 e P and A 2 e F .
The Set of Competitive Equilibrium Payo¤s
Let p 2 R G + be a price vector and A 2 F a feasible assignment of market M: We de…ne the utility of buyer i 2 B at the pair (p; A) as the total net gain obtained by i from his exchanges speci…ed by A at price p. We denote it by u i (p; A); namely,
We de…ne the utility of seller k 2 S at the pair (p; A) as the total net gain obtained by k from his exchanges speci…ed by A at price p. We denote it by w k (p; A); namely,
Given (p; A), denote by u(p; A) = (u i (p; A)) i2B and w(p; A) = (w k (p; A)) k2S the vector of buyers and sellers'utilities at (p; A), respectively. Let
w(e p; e A))g be the set of Competitive Equilibrium payo¤s of market M . However, competitive equilibrium payo¤ vectors are independent of the particular optimal assignment. To see that, de…ne the mappings of per-unit gains ( ) :
and for each (j; k) 2 G S, de…ne
The number i (p) is the gain obtained by buyer i from each unit that he wants to buy at p (if any) and the number jk (p) is the pro…t obtained by seller k from each unit of good j that he wants to sell at p (if any). Let e p 2 e P be a competitive equilibrium price of market M and let ( (e p); (e p)) be its associated per unit gains. De…ne (u(e p); w(e p)) 2 R B R S by
By Lemma 6 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s of market M can also be written as
S j there exists e p 2 e P such that(u; w) = (u(e p); w(e p))g;
that is, the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s of market M can be described without explicitly referring to any particular optimal assignment because, for all e A 2 e F , u i (e p; e A) = u i (e p) for all i 2 B and w k (e p; e A) = w k (e p) for all k 2 S.
Basic Results
In this subsection we describe the inclusion relationships among the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s, Set-wise stability and Core. First, the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is contained in the set of Set-wise stable payo¤s.
Proposition 5 Let e p 2 e P be a competitive equilibrium price vector of market M . Then, (u(e p); w(e p)) 2 SW.
Proof See the appendix. 
It is easy to see that the set of equilibrium price vectors of market M is e P = f(e p Moreover u 1 (e p) = 1 (e p) 6 and w 1 (e p) = 11 (e p) 3 + 21 (e p) 3:
Consider the payo¤ (u 1 ; w 1 ) = (15; 3). We …rst show that (u 1 ; w 1 ) 2 SW. Let = ( 111 ; 121 ) = (4; 3) be a distribution matrix and let C be a coalition. Consider the following three cases: But this holds because
Finally, we show that there does not exist a competitive equilibrium price vector e p such that (u(e p); w(e p)) = (15; 3): Assume otherwise; then, by (10) 
Observe that the distribution matrix used in the de…nition of Set-wise stability is not necessarily anonymous (i.e., ijk could be di¤erent to i 0 jk 0 ). However, the subset of Setwise stable payo¤s that are obtained from anonymous distribution matrices (i.e., price vectors) is indeed the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤ vectors. We state this fact as Proposition 6 below. A SW compatible with C we have that
Example 2 below shows that the Set-wise stable set may be a strict subset of the Core because there exist markets with (u; w) 2 CnSW: We …rst show that SW = f(3; 0; 0)g. Let (u 1 ; w 1 ; w 2 ) 2 SW be arbitrary. Then, u 1 + w 1 + w 2 = 3 and let = ( 111 ; 112 ) be any distribution matrix. Let C be a singleton coalition. Three cases are possible. Hence,
This implies that 112 = 1 because 112 1 = r 12 : Symmetrically, and by exchanging the roles of e A 10 and e A 20 , we obtain that 111 = 1: Hence, w 1 = w 2 = 0 and u 1 = 3. Therefore, by just checking singleton coalitions we already know (since SW 6 = ?) that SW = f(3; 0; 0)g: We now show that (2; 1; 0) 2 C: Since v(fb 1 ; s 1 ; s 2 g) = 3; v(fb 1 ; s 1 g) = v(fb 1 ; s 2 g) = 2; and v(fs 1 ; s 2 g) = v(fb 1 g) = v(fs 1 g) = v(fs 2 g) = 0, we conclude that C = f(3 1 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) j 1 0; 2 0 and 1 + 2 1g. Hence, (2; 1; 0) 2 C.
Thus, we have already showed that the statement of the following corollary holds. 4 Corollary 1 For every market M , ? 6 = CE SW C. Moreover, the two inclusions may be strict.
The fold Replicated Market: Three Limit Results
Competitive equilibrium presupposes that agents are price-takers. This assumption makes sense only when the number of agents is large and individual quantity decisions are insigni…cant. Thus, and at the light of Corollary 1, it is natural to ask whether the Core and the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s are approximately the same when the number of agents becomes large. By Corollary 1, an a¢ rmative answer to this question would imply that the Set-wise stable set tends to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s as well. To enlarge the market, we follow a procedure with a long tradition in Economics which consists of replicating the market. 5 Given a market M = (B; G; S; V; d; R; Q) and a strictly positive integer we will consider the fold replicated market M to be composed of agents of each type. For two buyers i 2 B and i 0 2 B 0 (in replicas and 0 , respectively) to be of the same type we require them to have the same valuations of all goods (i.e., v i j = v i 0 j = v ij for all j 2 G) and the same maximal demands (i.e.,
For two sellers k 2 S and k 0 2 S 0 (in replicas and 0 , respectively) to be of the same type we require them to have the same reservation prices of all goods (i.e., r jk = r jk 0 = r jk for all j 2 G) and the same amounts of all goods (i.e., q jk = q jk 0 = q jk for all j 2 G).
The following proposition says that the classical result stating that any payo¤ vector in the Core assigns the same utility to all agents of the same type also holds in this setting. 
We will say that a payo¤ vector (u; w) 2 R B R S is in the Core of the replicated market if (u ; w ) 2 C M . Our …rst limit result states that, for every market M , the sequence of Cores of the M markets converges, when ! 1, to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s of the replicated market.
S is in the Core of the fold replicated market for all 1, then (u; w) is a competitive equilibrium payo¤ of market M .
Proof See the appendix. 5 It started by Edgeworth (1881) and pursued by Debreu and Scarf (1963) for classical economies with production and by Owen (1975) for linear production games, among others. A linear production game consists of a set of players, each with an endowment (non necessarily integer valued) of m goods that can only be used to produce in a linear way units of p di¤erent goods for which there are competitive markets. Owen (1975) shows that the sequence of Cores of replicated linear production games converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. Moreover, Owen (1975) also shows that if the competitive equilibrium price is unique then the Core of a large but …nitely replicated game coincides with the (unique) competitive equilibrium payo¤.
Note that, by Corollary 1 and Proposition 7, we have that for all 1, SW M f((u; w); :::; (u; w)
Theorem 1 only guarantees convergence in the limit. In contrast, our second main result states that the Set-wise stable set of the 2 fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. Proof See the appendix.
Theorem 3 shows that a similar result does not hold for the Core. Namely, for each number of replicas there exists a market M for which the Core of the fold replicated market contains a payo¤ that is not a competitive equilibrium payo¤. Proof See the appendix.
Appendix: Preliminaries and Omitted Proofs
We start with some preliminaries. Let M be a market and C be a coalition. Consider the primal linear problem to which any optimal assignment e A C 2 e F C is a solution.
(PLP) C : max
The dual linear problem associated to (PLP) C is the following.
(DLP) C : min
Let D C be the set of pairs ( C ; Let M be a market and let C be a coalition. Then, it is immediate to check that the following two implications hold.
and
Let M be a market and ( ; ) 2 D be a dual feasible solution. We write T D M ( ; ) to denote the value of the objective function of the (DLP) B[S at ( ; ); that is,
The Strong Duality Theorem (SDT) of Linear Programming applied to our setting says the following (see Dantzig, 1963 
Proposition 1 Every market has a non-empty Core. 
and T M ( e A) = v(B [ S): Hence, (16) holds. Let C B [ S be an arbitrary coalition. We shall show that P
Observe …rst that, by (14), (e C ; e C ) 2 e D C : Therefore, for every (
The last equality follows from the Strong Duality Theorem. By the de…nition of the payo¤ vector (u (e C ;e
Hence, by (18), (17) holds. Since C was an arbitrary coalition, (u (e ;e ) ; w (e ;e ) ) 2 R B R S belongs to the Core of M .
Proof of Proposition 5 Let e
p 2 e P . We …rst show that
By Theorem 2 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), ( (e p); (e p)) 2 e D. Hence,
By the de…nition of (u(e p); w(e p)) 2 R
By (20) and (21),
Hence, by the Strong Duality Theorem, (19) holds: Assume (u(e p); w(e p)) = 2 SW. Then, there exists a coalition C B[S that SW blocks it. Hence, for every distribution matrix = ( ijk ) (i;j;k)2B G S there exists a feasible assignment b A that is SW compatible with C such that P
Consider the distribution matrix = ( ijk ) (i;j;k)2B G S where for each (i; j; k) 2 B G S, ijk = e p j . Then, there must exist a feasible assignment b A that is SW compatible with C where the new vector of maximal demands d is de…ned by setting
for all i 2 B, and the new matrix of capacities Q is de…ned by setting
and note that
and for each j 2 G,
Hence,
By (8), for every i 2 B and j 2 G,
Moreover, by (9), for every (j; k) 2 G S;
By (22) and (23)
By (24),
Hence, by (26),
By (25),
Hence, by (27), P
Observe that since b A is a feasible assignment,
where v M (C) = T M ( e A C ) for any optimal assignment e A C of market M . Since ( (e p); (e p)) 2 e D then by (14), ( C (e p); C (e p)) 2 e D C for market M . Hence, by the Strong Duality Theorem,
contradicting (28).
and only if there exists a competitive equilibrium price vector e p such that for every coalition C B [ S and any feasible assignment b
A SW compatible with C we have that
Proof of Proposition 6
)) It follows from Proposition 5. where i 2 B: Then, by assumption,
where b A is any feasible assignment. Consider now any coalition C = fkg, where k 2 S: Then, by assumption,
where b A is any feasible assignment. Finally, assume that e A is an optimal assignment. Then,
By de…nition of the per unit gains ijk ,
Hence, (29) and (30) imply that for every i 2 B and k 2 S,
and consequently, by Lemma 6 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), for every i 2 B and k 2 S,
Thus, (u; w) = (u(e p); w(e p)) and by (11), (u; w) 2 CE. 
must hold; otherwise, any coalition C = B [ S would Core block (b u; b w). Hence, for every = 1; :::; , X i 2B
Assume that there exists a buyer type b i 2 B and two replicas and 0 such that
Similarly for any seller type b k 2 S. Thus, ((b u i 1 ; :::;
To obtain a contradiction, assume that (u; w) = 2 C M . Then, there exists a coalition C that Core blocks (u; w): But then, C also Core blocks (b u; b w), a contradiction with
Proof of
for every i 2 B, and w k = P j jk q jk for every k 2 S; namely, (u; w) 2 CE:
Proof of Lemma 1 Let (u; w) 2 R B R S be a payo¤ vector of market M . Consider the following system of inequalities
Claim (u; w) 2 CE if and only if the system in (31) has at least one solution ( ; ).
Proof of Claim Necessity follows from (10) . To show su¢ ciency suppose ( ; ) is a solution of (31). Then,
Thus, by the Strong Duality Theorem, ( ; ) is a solution of the (DLP) B[S . Hence, (u; w) 2 CE. This proves the claim.
Consider the following Primal Linear Problem
and its associated Dual Linear Problem
Assume the system in (31) has no solution. Then, the Primal Linear Problem has no solution and the Dual Linear Problem has no solution either, and since ! 0 is a feasible vector of the Dual Linear Problem, the linear function
is unbounded. But this implies that there exists (y 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 ) such that
Since the …rst restriction holds with strict inequality, y 1 ; y 2 and y 3 can be vectors with rational components. Multiplying them by the lowest common denominator we can assume, without loss of generality, that y De…ne = maxfy Assume now that ((u; w; ); (u; w)) 2 SW 2M : Then, there exists a distribution matrix = ( ijk ) (i;j;k)22B G 2S such that for every coalition C 2B [ 2S and every feasible assignment b
A that is SW-compatible with C we have that:
(32) Fix and let e A 2 e F be any optimal assignment of market M .
Claim 1 For every i 2 B and every k 2 S;
hold.
Proof of Claim 1 By considering either C = fig or C = fkg; we have that, by (32),
the statement of Claim 1 follows.
Proof of Claim 2 Assume otherwise; for instance,
then replace in the argument that follows the roles of i 1 by i 2 and k 2 by k 1 . Consider the coalition C = fi 1 ; k 2 g: From e A we de…ne the assignment b A SW compatible with C by decreasing in 1 unit the exchanges between i 1 and k 1 and between i 2 and k 2 and by simultaneously increasing in 1 unit the exchange between i 1 and k 2 : Namely, for every (i; j; k) 2 B G S, de…ne
Observe that since by assumption e
A is SW compatible with C = fi 1 ; k 2 g. De…ne
By Claim 1 and the de…nition of b A,
Since by assumption
To proceed with the proof of Theorem 2 we de…ne a price vector p = (p j ) j2G 2 R G as follows. Consider …rst any j 2 G for which there exist i 2 B and k 2 S such that A ijk 6 = 0 for some optimal assignment A . Then, de…ne p j = ijk : By Claim 2, p j is well de…ned. Suppose now that j 2 G is such that for all optimal assignment A and all i 2 B and k 2 S, A ijk = 0. Then, de…ne p j = minfr jk j k is such that q jk > 0g; by (2), p j is well-de…ned. Let A 2 e F be arbitrary. We shall show that (p; A) is a competitive equilibrium of M by showing that the equilibrium conditions (E.D) and (E.S) are satis…ed.
Assume that X
Without loss of generality suppose that i 0 belongs to the …rst replica; i.e., i 0 = i 1 . Consider …rst the case where there are i 2 2 B 2 and k 2 2 S 2 with the property that A i 2 j 0 k 2 6 = 0.
Consider the coalition C = fi 1 ; k 2 g and its SW compatible assignment b A where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S,
By (33) and A i 2 j 0 k 2 6 = 0, b A is a feasible assignment and SW compatible with coalition fi 1 ; k 2 g. Then, proceeding in a similar way as we did in the proof of Claim 2, de…ne b u i 1 and b w k 2 as the payo¤s of buyer i 1 and seller k 2 at assignment b A, respectively. Then, By Claim 1 and the de…nition of b A,
(p): Assume now that for all i 00 2 2B and all k 00 2 2S, A i 00 j 0 k 00 = 0. By de…nition, p j 0 = minfr j 0 k j k is such that q j 0 k > 0g: Let k 2 2S be such that q j 0 k > 0 and p j 0 k = r j 0 k . By (2), such k does exist. Consider the coalition C = fi 1 ; k g and its SW compatible assignment b A where, for all (i; j; k) 2 2B G 2S
By (33) and q j 0 k > 0, b A is a feasible assignment. Then, as before, 
De…ne b u i 0 as the utility of buyer i 0 at assignment b A: Then, it is immediate to see that
Case 2: There exists j 00 2 r i 0 (p) such that
Note that A i 0 j 0 k 0 6 = 0: By de…nition of p, p j 0 = i 0 j 0 k 0 : Assume …rst that there exist i 00 2 2B
and k 00 2 2S such that A i 00 j 00 k 00 6 = 0: Again, by de…nition p, p j 00 = i 00 j 00 k 00 : Consider the coalition C = fi 0 ; k 00 g and its SW compatible assignment b A where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S,
Then, proceeding in a similar way as we did in the proof of Claim 2, de…ne b u i 0 and b w k 00 as the payo¤s of buyer i 0 and seller k 00 at assignment b A, respectively. Then, By Claim 1 and the de…nition of b A,
i 0 j 00 k 00 ) A i 0 j 00 k 00 +( i 0 j 00 k 00 r j 00 k 00 ) A i 0 j 00 k 00 + ( i 00 j 00 k 00 r j 00 k 00 ) A i 00 j 00 k 00
A i 0 j 00 k 00 ( i 00 j 00 k 00 r j 00 k 00 ) b A i 00 j 00 k 00 = (v i 0 j 0 i 0 j 0 k 0 ) (v i 0 j 00 i 0 j 00 k 00 ) ( i 0 j 00 k 00 r j 00 k 00 ) + ( i 00 j 00 k 00 r j 00 k 00 ) = v i 0 j 0 p j 0 v i 0 j 00 + p j 00 p j 00 + r j 00 k 00 + p j 00 r j 00 k 00 = v i 0 j 0 p j 0 (v i 0 j 00 p j 00 ):
By (34), u i 0 + w k 00 (b u i 0 + b w k 00 ) < 0, a contradiction with (32). Assume now that for all i 00 2 2B and all k 00 2 2S, A i 00 j 00 k 00 = 0: By de…nition, p j 00 = minfr j 00 k j k is such that q j 00 k > 0g: Let k 2 2S be such that q j 00 k > 0 and p j 00 = r j 00 k : By (2), such k does exist.
Consider the coalition C = fi 0 ; k g and its SW compatible assignment b A where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S, 
i 0 j 00 k ) b A i 0 j 00 k ( i 0 j 00 k r j 00 k ) b A i 0 j 00 k = (v i 0 j 0 i 0 j 0 k 0 ) (v i 0 j 00 i 0 j 00 k ) ( i 0 j 00 k r j 00 k ) = v i 0 j 0 p j 0 (v i 0 j 00 r j 00 k ):
By (32), v i 0 j 0 p j 0 v i 0 j 00 r j 00 k : Since by its de…nition, p j 00 = r j 00 k ; v i 0 j 0 p j 0 v i 0 j 00 p j 00 ; a contradiction with (34). De…ne b w k 0 as the utility of seller k 0 at assignment b A: Then, it is immediate to see that w k 0 < b w k 0 ; contradicting (32). Assume now that p j 0 = r j 0 k 0 : We want to show that 0 P i A ij 0 k 0 q j 0 k 0 : But this holds because A is a feasible assignment.
Finally, assume that p j 0 > r j 0 k 0 : We want to show that P i A ij 0 k 0 = q j 0 k 0 : Assume P i A ij 0 k 0 < q j 0 k 0 : Hence, Since by assumption p j 0 > r j 0 k 0 , u i 0 +w k 0 (b u i 0 + b w k 0 ) < 0, a contradiction with (32). Assume now that for all i 0 2 2B and all k 00 2 2S, A i 0 j 0 k 00 = 0: By de…nition, p j 0 = minfr j 0 k j k is such that q j 0 k > 0g: Let k 2 2S be such that q j 0 k > 0 and p j 0 = r j 0 k : By (2), such k does exist. By (35) and the de…nition of p j 0 , p j 0 r j 0 k 0 , a contradiction with the initial assumption that p j 0 > r j 0 k 0 . Theorem 3 Let 2 Z + nf0g. Then, there exist a market M and a payo¤ vector (u; w) = 2 CE such that (u ; w ) 2 C M .
Proof of Theorem 3 Fix 2 Z + nf0g. De…ne M as follows: B = fb 1 g; S = fs 1 ; s 2 g, G = fg 1 g, v 11 = 1, r 11 = r 12 = 0, d 1 = 4 1 and q 11 = q 12 = 2 . It is easy to see that since the short side of the market is the demand, the unique competitive equilibrium price is e 
The value of coalition C is
and P i2B C u i + P k2S C w k = (4 3) + :
We want to show that for all and satisfying (36), P i2B C
Assume …rst that C is such that 2 . Then, by (37) and (38), (39) holds if and only if (4 3) + (4 1) holds, which follows from 2 . Assume now that C is such that 2 > . Then, by (37) and (38) 
